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its flaws, the United Nations remains one of the best hopes for advance-
ment of the rule of law in the world.
Respectfully submitted,
Joseph P. Griffin Robert C. Mussehl
Chairman, Section of Chairman, Standing Committee on
International Law and Practice World Order Under Law
William L. Robinson






Law and National Security
Report to the House of Delegates*
III. INF Treaty
RECOMMENDATIONS
BE IT RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association urges the Senate
of the United States to give its advice and consent to the ratification of
the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and
Shorter-Range Missiles, which Treaty totally eliminates those missiles,
and which is subject to effective verification;
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association
recommends that, in future negotiations, the United States give priority
to the negotiations on the Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty and
on conventional arms stability in Europe.
*The report was prepared by the Section's Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament,
Thomas Graham, Jr., Chairman.
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The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, designed to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries, was signed
July I, 1968, ratified by the United States on November 24, 1969, and
entered into force on March 5, 1970. In Article VI "Each of the Parties
to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date
and to nuclear disarmament. . . ." This commitment was repeated in
subsequent nuclear arms control treaties of which the United States and
the Soviet Union are parties.
Mindful of this obligation and conscious that nuclear war would have
devastating consequences for all mankind, the United States and the So-
viet Union recently signed a treaty to eliminate their intermediate-range
(INF) and shorter-range missiles, stating their conviction that the mea-
sures set forth in the Treaty would help to reduce the risk of outbreak of
war and strengthen international peace and security.
Similarly, the President has expressed the hope that a Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START) may be signed within the coming year. Since
an uncontrolled arms race in strategic nuclear missiles, with longer, in-
tercontinental ranges and greater firepower, represents a grave threat to
world peace and security, the United States has been striving for a gen-
eration to control this arms race. This country has had such a proposal
on the negotiating table in Geneva since 1982. In the fall of 1986, at
Reykjavik, Iceland, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev
agreed in principle to a 50% reduction over 5 years to 1,600 strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles with 6,000 warheads on them; made important
advances in rules for counting bomber loads; and reached agreement in
principle on the requirement for "significant cuts" in Soviet heavy ICBMs,
the most destabilizing missiles of all.
The possibility of nuclear reductions in both INF and START has fo-
cused renewed attention on the conventional imbalance in Europe, heavily
in favor of the Warsaw Pact.
No accord has been reached at the Mutual and Balanced Force Re-
duction Talks in Vienna, but East and West have come forward with new,
hopeful initiatives in conventional arms control. In May 1986, NATO
Foreign Ministers meeting in Halifax called for strengthened security and
stability in the whole of Europe at lower levels of conventional forces.
The next month, the Warsaw Pact issued its Budapest Appeal which also
called for conventional force cuts from the "Atlantic to the Urals," a
much broader area than the MBFR zone.
Following up on the Halifax statement, NATO established the High
Level Task Force on conventional arms control to conduct a review of
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policy in this area and point the way ahead. One result is a draft negotiating
mandate for a conference on force levels-the "stability" talks-among
the 16 NATO and 7 Warsaw Pact alliance members. NATO countries tabled
this draft mandate on July 27, 1987 in formal East/West discussions taking
place in Vienna.
Accordifig to U.S. Government sources, the Soviets have shown a clear
desire to move ahead promptly toward the establishment of a new con-
ventional stability negotiation. There are serious problems, however, be-
ginning with the Soviet refusal to admit their overall conventional
superiority. The Soviets also want to mix "tactical" nuclear systems into
the conventional talks. They hope in this way to pursue their objective
of de-nuclearizing Europe through the back door, as it were. The U.S.
priorities, in a post-INF environment, should be to reduce strategic nu-
clear as well as chemical and conventional weapons before tackling short-
range nuclear systems.
In addition, NATO's approach should, as a matter of priority, focus on
ground forces, i.e., those forces most essential to an invasion capability,
the ability to seize and hold territory; must not be simply a reductions
proposal-stability may be approached through a variety of means, in-
cluding limitations, redeployments, and related measures, as well as re-
ductions; and it must be verifiable with adequate exchange of information.
The INF Treaty is the result of long negotiations described in the annex,
which, after considerable difficulty, led to an agreement not only on the
total elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, but also
to more effective means of verification than previously possible.
By means of this resolution and the recommendations contained therein,
the American Bar Association would be supporting: (a) the United States
goal of controlling the nuclear arms race with meaningful reductions by
the ratification of an effectively verifiable Treaty between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles; and
(b) the further strengthening of the existing regime of nuclear arms control
and lessening the likelihood of conventional conflict which could escalate
into nuclear war.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard E. Freidman, Joseph P. Griffin,
Chairman Chairman
Standing Committee on Section of International Law
Law and National Security and Practice
February 1988
VOL. 22, NO. 4
SECTION RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 1291
Annex
Negotiating History of the INF Treaty
Soviet achievement of strategic nuclear parity with the U.S. in the mid-
1970s, and Soviet deployment of mobile, triple-warhead intermediate-
range SS-20 missiles beginning in 1977, led to a growing imbalance of
intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. As the SS-20 missile force
grew with no countervailing U.S. missiles deployed in Europe, European
members of NATO were concerned that Moscow might come to believe
U.S. strategic forces could be decoupled from the defense of Europe.
Such a misconception could call into question the strategies of deterrence
and flexible response that have kept the peace in Europe.
Following intensive consultations, NATO decided in December 1979 on
a "dual-track" response:
" Phased deployment in Europe of 572 U.S. longer-range INF missiles
(LRINF missiles-those with a range of 1,000-5,500 km., i.e., 600-
3400 mi.). Up to December 1986, the U.S. had deployed 316 LRINF
missiles: 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 208 ground-launched
cruise missiles.
" At the same time, negotiations with the USSR to establish a global
balance in U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles at the lowest level and
to seek constraints on shorter-range INF missiles (SRINF missiles-
500-1,000 km., i.e, 300-600 mi. range).
Negotiating developments between 1981 and 1987 were as follows:
" November 1981-Bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations on INF began at
Geneva. At that time, the U.S. proposed the "zero option," banning
or eliminating all U.S. and Soviet LRINF missile systems, including
Soviet SS-20s, SS-4s and SS-5s, and the U.S. Pershing Is and ground-
launched cruise missiles. The Soviets rejected this proposal.
* March 1983-Although the global zero option remained the U.S.
preferred outcome, the U.S. proposed an interim agreement for equal
global limits on LRINF missile warheads at any number below planned
U.S. deployments.
" November 1983-The Soviets walked out of the INF talks, protesting
the arrival of the first U.S. LRINF missiles in Europe, although they
had continued throughout the negotiations to deploy SS-20 missiles.
" March 1985-The Soviets returned to the talks and agreed to a new
set of arms control negotiations, the nuclear and space talks (NST),
that include INF.
" November 1985-At the Geneva Summit, President Reagan and Gen-
eral Secretary Gorbachev agreed to accelerate work toward an in-
terim INF agreement separate from other NST issues.
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" October 1986-At their Reykjavik meeting, the two leaders agreed
in principle to an equal global limit of 100 warheads on LRINF mis-
siles for each side, with none in Europe. The remaining missiles would
be deployed in Soviet Asia and on U.S. territory. In addition, the
two sides agreed to exclude for each side, with none in Europe. The
remaining missiles would be deployed in Soviet Asia and on U.S.
territory. In addition, the two sides agreed to exclude UK and French
systems and to constrain SRINF missile systems in an INF agree-
ment, positions long held by the U.S. Mr. Gorbachev, however, in-
sisted on a "package" agreement linking INF to strategic arms
reductions and defense and space issues.
* February 1987-Mr. Gorbachev reversed course and announced that
the USSR was now ready for a separate INF agreement. The U.S.
then presented an INF draft treaty text at Geneva in March. This
draft text reflects the Reykjavik INF agreement. In response, the
Soviet Union presented a draft on April 27.
" April 1987-Secretary Shultz met in Moscow with Mr. Gorbachev
and Foreign Minister Shevardnaze, and Mr. Gorbachev proposed the
global elimination of U.S. and Soviet SRINF missiles. (The U.S. has
no deployed SRINF missiles; the Soviet Union has deployed more
than 100 such missiles.)
" June 1987-NATO foreign ministers expressed their support for the
verifiable global elimination of all U.S. and Soviet SRINF missiles.
Reflecting the NATO recommendation, the President announced that
the U.S. would support the elimination of U.S. and Soviet SRINF
missiles, provided it was global, bilateral, effectively verifiable, an
integral part of an INF agreement, and included the Soviet SS-12 and
SS-23. The U.S. presented this proposal in Geneva and emphasized
the continued U.S. preference for the global elimination of U.S. and
Soviet LRINF missiles as well.
" July 1987-Gorbachev announced a change in the Soviet position on
INF. The Soviets essentially accepted the "double global zero"
proposal.
* August 1987-Soviet arms negotiator Obukhov said that the USSR
will consider a compromise to resolve U.S.-Soviet differences over
West Germany's Pershing IA missiles. The Soviets had called the
missiles "the main barrier" to an INF agreement and had demanded
elimination of these missiles.
U.S. arms negotiator Max Kampelman stated: "We will not, in a
bilateral relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union,
have a provision in that agreement which affects our allies."
Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany announced
that West Germany will dismantle its 72 shorter-range INF Pershing
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IA missiles, and will not replace them with more modern weapons,
if the United States and the Soviet Union would:
eliminate all of their own LRINF and SRINF missiles as foreseen
under the proposed INF Treaty; adhere to whatever schedule is
agreed to for eliminating their missiles;
comply with the terms of the Treaty.
The Soviet Union welcomed Chancellor Kohl's statement. A
spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry stated the possibility of
concluding a new superpower arms agreement was now "realistic."
* September 1987-New U.S. verification proposals called for what
our government calls the most stringent verification regime in arms
control history. Key elements of the proposal included:
detailed exchange of data on INF missiles and launchers and
associated support facilities; notification of movement of mis-
siles and launchers; baseline inspection to verify number of mis-
sile and launchers; on-site inspection to verify elimination of
missiles and launchers; close-out inspection at declared facilities
to ensure that INF-related activities have ended; short-notice
inspection of declared facilities and of certain other missile-
related facilities in the U.S. and USSR to ensure against illegal
missile activity, for thirteen years after entry into force of the
Treaty.
Following a meeting in Washington, Secretary of State Shultz and
Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announced that the U.S. and
the Soviet Union had reached agreement in principle to conclude an
INF Treaty.
* October 1987-It was announced that the U.S. and Soviet Union had
agreed on a mutually satisfactory way of handling the Pershing IA
issue that takes into account the statement by Chancellor Kohl and
U.S. plans concerning disposition of the warheads for the Federal
Republic's Pershing IA missiles, but which puts no limit on these
third country missiles in the text of the U.S.-Soviet INF Treaty.
During meetings between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that
General Secretary Gorbachev would visit Washington beginning De-
cember 7, 1987, and that he and President Reagan would sign the
INF Treaty.
ERRATUM
The Recommendation and Report on Public Disclosure by Foreign Investors, pub-
lished in the Fall 1988 issue of THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER, was prepared by the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, Michael F. Butler, Chairman.
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